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PRELIMINARY MEMORANDUM
January 6, 1983 Conference
List 1, Sheet 1
No. 83-491
INS

?

v.
LOPEZ-MENDOZA

1.

Federal/Civil

SUMMARY:

Timely

Petr challenges the CA9's ruling that the

exclusionary rule applies to deportation proceedings.
2.

FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW:

This petn involves two

cases that were consolidated on appeal before the CA9.
cases involve

d ~ po~QD

Both

p roceepings in which an illegal alien

sought to suppress the use in their deportation proceeding of

f

,

Resp Sandoval was apprehended in 1977 at his place of
employment, a potato processing plant in Pasco, Washington.

The

search of the plant was not authorized by warrant, but the INS
officers had permission from the company officials to question
some of the company employees.

The officials stationed

themselves at the entrance to the main work area during a change
of shift.

As employees walked past, they questioned those that

looked suspicious.

Those who the officers wanted to question in

greater detail were detained in a restroom and cleanup area.
Resp Sandoval was among those detained.

There is no evidence in

the record of whether he was questioned further in the restroom.
Eventually, however, 37 aliens who had been detained in the
restroom, including Sandoval, were transported to the Franklin
County Jail and processed in the training room of the local
~

police department.

Those who wished to depart for Mexico

voluntarily were placed on a bus leaving that day.

Those who

demanded a deportation hearing, including Sandoval, were
questioned further; during this questioning Sandoval admitted
that he had entered the country unlawfully, and his admission was
reduced to writing.

At a hearing before an immigration law

judge, Sandoval contended that he had been seized in violation of
the Fourth Amendment.

The judge rejected that claim, finding

that Sandoval's "furtive" behavior and "foreign appearance" were
sufficient to give rise to a suspicion of alienage.
Resp Lopez was arrested in 1976 at his place of
employment, an automobile transmission repair shop.

'

Two

immigration officers went to the shop, apparently on a tip that

they would find seven illegal aliens employed there.

Resp

Lopez's name was not one of the seven names on their list.

The

officers identified themselves to the proprietor of the shop and
asked if they could talk to his employees.

The proprietor

refused, but the officers nevertheless proceeded to question resp
Lopez.

In response to questioning by the officers, Lopez

admitted that he was from Mexico and had no close family ties in
the United States.

The officers took him into custody.

Both an immigration judge and the Board of Immigration
Appeals found Lopez deportable.

Both rejected claims by Lopez

that he had been arrested illegally, because each concluded that
an unlawful arrest had no bearing on subsequent deportation
proceedings.
The CA9 reversed Sandoval's deportation order and
~

vacated and remanded Lopez's deportation order.

Six panel

members, in an opinion written by Judge Norris, held that
Sandoval's admission was the fruit of an unlawful arrest, and
that the exclusionary rule required suppression of the evidence.
Judge Goodwin concurred separately.

In reaching its decision,

the majority applied the analysis set forth in United States v.
Janis, 428

u.s.

433 {1976).

The court first examined the

connection between those who illegally obtained the evidence and
those that seek to use it in a subsequent proceeding.

The court

observed that not only are the officers and prosecutors members
of the same government agency, but they also share a common goal
and purpose.

'

For this reason, the deterrent effect of the

exclusionary sanction would be great.

The court also concluded

- 4 -

that alternative checks on agency activity were not adequate to
deter the activity.

The court then analyzed the costs of

applying the exclusionary rule.

It concluded that the number of

aliens that would request suppression hearings and the number
that would win them would be very small.

Until Matter of

Sandoval (no relation to resp), 17 I.&N. Dec. 70, (1979) the INS
had assumed that the exclusionary rule applied in deportation
proceedings; between 1952 and 1979 fewer than fifty Fourth
Amendment challenges to the introduction of evidence had been
raised. App. 52a. The court concluded that such a

mi~scule

burden on the INS was a small price to pay for the deterrent
effects that the exclusionary rule would create.
Judge Alarcon wrote the principal dissent, a 45-page
statement arguing that there was nothing in the record from which
~

it could reasonably be inferred that immigration officers
routinely conduct unreasonable searches and seizures.

He also

argued that there were no "facts that would support an inference
that extending the exclusionary rule to civil deportation
proceedings would act as a significant deterrent to present INS
practices." App. 46a.

Hence, he was of the view that the

majority had "created a remedy for which there is no demonstrated
need." Ibid.

On the cost side, the principal dissent noted that,

under the "fruit of the poisonous tree" concept, suppression
could immunize an alien perpetually from deportation despite his
continuing violation of the immigration laws.

Moreover, the

dissent noted that requiring suppression hearings in deportation

'

proceedings "could result in protracted interruption of the

- 5 proceedings, and may seriously impede enforcement of our nation's
immigration laws."

App. at 72a.

The dissent therefore took

issue with the majority's claim that application of the
exclusionary rule would not significantly increase the number of
illegal aliens allowed to remain in the United States.

Finally,

the dissent was of the view that INS's procedures for
disciplining officers who conduct illegal searches and seizures
made application of the exclusionary rule to deportation
proceedings unnecessary.
3.

CONTENTIONS:

The SG makes several arguments.

He

firs ~notes that the exclusionary rule is particularly
inappropriate in deportation proceedings because when an illegal
alien is allowed to remain in the United States, there is an
I

o~going

violation of law.

This factor distinguishes deportation

proceedings from other proceedings where the prosecution is for a
past and completed act.

The rest of the SG's arguments are to

the effect that the CA9 simply miscalculated the costs and
benefits of applying the rule.

He argues that the result of the

rule will be to allow many illegal aliens to remain in the
country indefinitely.
In addition, the effect of the rule will be to change
drastically the nature of deportation proceedings, which are
designed to be summary in nature.

The availability of

suppression hearings will provide an illegal alien with a means
to delay his deportation, and drastically slow the processing of
aliens, which currently takes place very rapidly.

INS officers

will now also be forced to try and remember precisely the

- 6 '

)

circumstances surrounding each decision to detain someone in
order to be able to respond to suppression motions.

This burden

is unworkable, given that arrests of illegal aliens often occur
in large groups, with an individual officer responsible for
several arrests on a given day.

This process is very different

from the process of a policeman enforcing the criminal law, in
which there is generally a very specific target of an
investigation and the number of arrests by any individual officer
is relatively small.

Thus, the SG claims that application of the

exclusionary rule to deportation proceedings threatens to
undermine the enforcement efforts of the INS just at a time when
the problem of illegal aliens is at its worst.
The response argues that the government
I
~

mischaracterizes the significance of the CA9 decision.
no conflict among the circuits.

There is

The only other circuit to

consider the issue in recent times concluded that the
exclusionary rule did apply, Wong Chung Che v. INS, 565 F.2d 166
(CAl 1977).

Moreover, prior to Matter of Sandoval, 17 1. & N.

Dec. at 80 (1979), the understanding of the INS had always been
that the exclusionary rule was applicable in deportation
proceedings.

The long history of successful INS enforcement of

immigration laws despite the application of the exclusionary rule
belies the government's predicition of a parade of horribles.
The fact that the government's argument is all based on
predictions of the future effect of the rule when for years it
applied to their proceedings is evidence of the fact that the

'

government's fears are all exagerated.

Moreover, the government mischaracterizes the effect of
the application of the rule on an alien's ability. to remain in
this country.

Application of the rule does not indefinitely

immunize an illegal alien from deportation.

He remains subject

to deportation based on untainted evidence, and can be arrested
and deported at any time based upon untainted evidence.
The government is also wrong in its claim that
application of the rule will result in numerous suppression
hearings that will change the summary nature of deportation
proceedings.

Regardless of the application of the exclusionary

rule, an alien has a right to a hearing on the issue of
deportability, and that hearing must comport with Fifth Amendment
guarantees of due process.
I

Accordingly, an alien that wishes to

obstruct the summary nature of deportation can already do so by
exercising his right to such a hearing.

That right has not in

the past caused significant delay in the process.

There is no

reason to suspect that the availability of a suppression hearing
will add significantly to the delay.

As for the feasibility of

other forms of deterrence, they are all desirable and reasonable,
but they are better seen as ways to supplement the effectiveness
of the exclusionary rule.
4.

DISCUSSION:

The issue in this case is undoubtedly

controversial, as evidenced by the CA9's decision to hear the
c~ c, the long opinions by the majority and dissent, and

the SG's strong urging that this Court hear it.
little to add.
(

I do not think

that the SG's dark predicitions about the effect of the rule

provide a very strong response to respondent's point that for
years the exclusionary rule was assumed to apply to deportation

_____

and there is no evidence that
,proceedings,~--------~--~--------------burden ddring that time.

----------

it was a significant

The majority opinion notes, and neither

the dissent nor the SG dispute, that since 1952 there has been a
total of fewer than fifty fourth Amendment challenges to the

--------

admissibility of evidence in deportation proceedings.

I find

this statistic suprising, given that until 1979 the INS applied
the exclusionary rule to its own proceedings.

The majority

opinion explains the statistic by pointing out that the vast
majority of illegal aliens that are arrested leave the country
voluntarily; they have an incentive to do so because once a
person has been deported it is a felony to reenter the country.
The SG offers no other explanation for the few instances in which
~

aliens have brought Fourth Amendment challenges in the past.
Instead, the SG ignores entirely the past experiences of the INS
operating under the exclusionary rule, and makes a series of dire
predictions of how the rule will operate in the future.

It is my

guess, therefore, that the SG is exagerating the importance of
the CA9 decision.
The respondent is also correct that there is not a
split in the circuits on the issue.

Moreover, because under

Janis the determinat1on of whether to apply the rule involves a
cost-benefit calculus, it may be desirable to let the INS operate
under the rule for a while in order to develop some empirical
evidence on its current effect.

Nevertheless, the Court may want

to hear this case simply because it is a question of first

.·

-

9 -

impression in this Court, and the government clearly wants it
heard.
5.

RECOMMENDATION:

I have no recommendation.

There is a response.
December 13, 1983

Bartlett
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Cammie R. Robinson

INS v. Lopez & Sandoval

April 11, 1984

Question Presented

Whether the exclusionary rule applies in deportation
hearings.

FACTS & PROCEEDINGS BELOW

The facts are relatively unimportant here as the 4th
Amendment violation is not at issue.
"'---

-

~

--

----------::::

The only question is

whether the exclusionary rule of the 4th Amendment applies in
deportation hearings to exclude evidence seized as a result of an
illegal arrest.

CA9 in a divided en bane decision held that it

DISCUSSION

The deportation proceedings at issue here are entirely
civil in nature.

-

See Woodby v. INS, 385 u.s. 276, 285 (1966);

Fonq Yue Ting v. United States, 149 u.s. 698, 730 (1893).

This

Court has never applied the 4th Amendment exclusionary rule to

-~

---

(1976) • 1

The SG does not argue that the exclusionary rule shoulo

su~ngs.

-

..

~

United States v. Janis, 428 u.s. 433, 447

never apply to civil proceedings.

~11"

~

He argues only that its

application in deportation hearings will not further deterrence
sufficiently to outweigh its social costs.

2

Respondents take the

1 The Court has applied the exclusionary rule to civil
proceedings of a quasi-criminal nature.
See One Plymouth Sedan
v. Pennsylvania, 380 u.s. 693 (1965).
2 so far dicta in one of this Court's decisions, United States
ex rel. Bribkumsky v. Tod, 263 u.s. 149, 155 (1923) (semble), an
opinion of one of the federal CAs, Wong Chung Che v. INS, 565
F.2d 166, 169 (CAl 1977), and several scholarly treatises have
) indicated that the exclusionary rule applies in deportation
)Proceedings.
See, e.g., Gordon & Rosenfield, Immigration Law &
Footnote continued on next page.

...

contrary view.

The dispute, therefore, is over the proper
--··----~~

balance between the benefits of deterrence and the social costs

-----------

--·

of exclusion in the context of deportation hearings.
~-

controlling cases are Janis, 428
opinion

in ~ ited

u.s.

The two

447 (1976), and your Court

States v. Calandra, 414

u.s.

338 (1974).

In

both cases, the Court held the exclusionary rule inapplicable in
the particular contexts at issue. 3

The balancing analysis

articulated in those two opinions, however, suggests that the
exclusionary rule may be applicable in deportation hearings.

1

The first step is to identify those whose conduct is to
be deterred and to determine whether exclusion is likely to
deter.

Thereafter, several principles apply.

First, exclusion

of relevant evidence generally is unwarranted when "[i]t falls
outside the offending official's zone of primary interest."
Janis, 428

u.s.,

at 458.

In Janis, the exclusionary rule was

urged to deter the conduct of state criminal law enforcement
officals by excluding evidence from federal civil proceedings.
The Court reasoned that the deterrent effect of the exclusionary
rule in that case was too attenuated to justify its social costs.
Id.

Such is not the case here.

The INS officials who made the

illegal arrests wen/ 'pr imar i ly responsib le for gathering evidence

Procedure §5.2.c, at 5-31 (1980).
3 In Janis, the Court held that the exclusionary rule would not
apply to exclude evidence obtained by a state criminal law
enforcement officer from a federal civil tax proceeding. In
Calandra, the Court held that the exclusionary rule did not apply
to grand jury proceedings.

to secure the deportation of illegal aliens.

Exclusion of the

tainted evidence in this case, therefore, falls within "the
offending official's zone of primary interest.
Second, the deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule is
' - - - · - - --·g teate ~

-·-·

where it is the primary deterrent.

The Court concluded

that exclusion was unnecessary in Janis because the state
official whose conduct was to be controlled already was deterred
by the exclusion of evidence in state criminal proceedings, and
by the exclusion of evidence in federal criminal proceedings.
Janis, 428

u.s.,

at 448.

The Court held that "the additional

marginal deterrence" achieved by excluding the evidence from the
federal civil proceedings was not worth the social cost entailed.
Id • , at 4 53 • 4 This case is distinguishable. Here, the illegal
__,...._____·---------::=--.
evidence was obtained solely with an eye toward deportation. The
likelihood that it would be used in subsequent criminal
proceedings was small, see Cert. Pet., at 24a, and of little
concern to the INS officials who committed the violations.

Thus,

exclusion in other ·proceedings will do little to deter the
conduct at issue here.

Exclusion in deportation proceedings, on

the other hand, may deter a great deal.

The SG's argument that

--------------------~'4 rn Calandra, the Court held that exclusion of evidence from
grand jury proce~dings would not significantly further deterrence
because the evidence would be · excluded from any subsequent
criminal trial on the merits. The Court reasoned that law
enforcement officials would have no incentive to violate the
Fourth Amendment to obtain evidence that would be admissible only
in grand jury proceedings, but that would be unavailable to
obtain a conviction. 414 u.s:, at 351. Here, by contrast the
deportation hearing is the only hearing on the merits.

>,

-..

.·

similarly effective, but less drastic, means of deterrence are
available is unpersuasive.
The SG relies on the availability of injunctive relief,
Bivens suits, and internal disciplinary measures.

Injunctive

relief may be obtained only after significant constitutional
violations have taken place, and only if the plaintiff can
demonstrate standing --no easy task
103 s.ct. 1660 (1983). 5

after ~s

Angeles v. Lyons,

It is unrealistic to expect those most

likely to be detained in connection with deportation proceedings
to have the legal knowledge or the financial means to initiate
Bivens actions.

Finally, the SG's reliance on internal

disciplinary measures has been rejected in other contexts, and
there is no reason to believe the INS is any more capable of
effective self-discipline than other law enforcement agencies. 6

5Moreover, injunctive relief may pose greater administrative
headaches for INS officials than the simple exclusionary rule.
6 The SG makes much of the INS' "comprehensive" internal
disciplinary procedures. See SG's Br., at 41-46. An INS agent
who misbehaves "'may be subject to agency disciplinary action
with possible penalties ranging from an official letter of
reprimand to removal from his . job."' Id., at 43 (quoting INS,
u.s. Dept. Justice, The Law of Arrest, Search, and Seizure for
Immigration Officers 35 (Jan. 1983). The SG argues that the fact
that 20 INS agents have been suspended or terminated in the past
4 years for civil ri~hts violations indicates that agency selfdiscipline is effective.
Resp's Brief points out that of the 11
agents who were terminated because of INS disciplinary action, 3
were terminated for rapes of aliens; 3 for assaults on federal
undercover officers posing as aliens; 2 for physically abusing
and causing injury to detained aliens; 2 for physically abusing
detainees; 1 for physically abusing a Mexican national applying
for admission.
Resps' Br., at 60 n. 42. The INS report Resps
have lodged with the Clerk documents this. No information is
given on the other 9 agents whom the SG states have been subject
to milder discplinary measures.

7~

The SG argues that the social costs attending
application of the exclusionary rule to deportation hearings far
outweigh the benefits.

The SG identifies the following costs:

1. Exclusion of evidence may enable an illegal alien to
remain in this country.

The exclusionary rule thus countenances

continuing illegal conduct.

In contrast, exclusion of evidence

in a criminal trial merely allows a criminal to escape punishment
for past crimes.
unpersuasive.

SG's Br., at 24-26.

I find this argument

One hardly could argue that there is a greater

social cost from allowing an illegal alien to remain in this
country than from allowing a murderer to go free.
2. Envocation of the exclusionary rule will complicate
otherwise simple deportation hearings.

Deportation hearings must

be completed quickly to deal with the vast numbers of illegal
aliens.

Forcing the hearing officers to resolve constitutional

questions they are not qualified to resolve will prolong the
already overburdened process.

Moreover, once it is known that

the exclusionary rule is available, aliens who otherwise would
have left the country voluntarily will demand a hearing and
allege 4th Amendment violations.

SG's Br., at 26-31.

The

numbers of illegal aliens entering this country and the number of
deportation hearings held each year is staggering.

Nevertheless,

I find the SG's argument unpersuasive for several reasons.

---

First, the INS uniformly applied the exclusionary rule to
deportation hearings until 1979 with no apparent adverse
co~

(J.A. at 163)

Matter of Sandoval, 17 I. & N. Dec. 70 (Aug.
(holding for the first time that the

exclusionary~

~~'
...

.. l-~

..
..

rule does not apply).

In that case, the Board of Immigration

Appeals [BIA] itself observed:
"It might be presumed that '[the societal] costs' [of
the exclusionary rule] would be minimal in view of the
fact that since 1899 we can find only two reported
cases in which unlawfully seized evidence was in fact
excluded from deportation proceedings and only one
other case in which appliCfbility of [the] rule was
addressed." J.A., at 177.
Second, CA9 explained that most illegal aliens do not demand a
deportation hearing, but choose to leave the country voluntarily.
Cert. Pet., at 29a.

This is largely because those who are

deported following formal deportation proceedings are subject to
tough constraints on any legal reentry they may make, and illegal
reentry after formal deporation constitutes a felony.

8 u.s.c.

§1326. 8
3. Application of the exclusionary rule will require INS
agents to modify their enforcement techniques.

Under current

practice, a small number of INS agents are able to roundup large
numbers of illegal aliens.
No. 82-1271).

(E.g. factory surveys, see Delgado,

If these agents later are required to prove that

7 since 1952, 4th Amendment challenges to the introduction of
evidence has been made in fewer than 50 BIA proceedings. See
Cert. Pet., at 28a.
8Even if these incentives for waiving a hearing were not
sufficient to curb the envocation of the exclusionary rule,
absence of legal counsel would be. Most undocumented aliens are
not represented by counsel and are unfamiliar with their legal
rights.
The alien's right to counsel in civil deportation
proceedings extends only to counsel retained at no expense to the
government.
See 8 u.s.c. §1252(b) (2): 8 C.F.R. §292.1. Thus,
there is little reason to suspect that the exclusionary rule will
become as popular with illegal aliens as it is with criminals.

page 8
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probable cause existed for any subsequent arrests, they would
have to "compile detailed, contemporaneous, written reports
recording the circumstances of each individual arrest."
Br., at 33.

SG's

Moreover, INS agents would be forced to attend any

deportation hearing in which a 4th Amendment violation was
alleged.

Id., at 31-33.

unpersuasive.

Again, I find the SG's arguments

First, none of these horribles existed prior to

1979 when the exclusionary rule was thought applicable to
deportation hearings.

Second, I don't think it outrageous to

require INS agents to show they had probable cause to arrest an

------···------.--....--......._---------..._ ~-----~--...

illegal alien.

like Terry stops.
stop.

----~------------

The factory surveys are not arrests, but more
No one suggests in this case that these must

In sum, I do not believe that the SG has shown that the
I

social costs of applying the exclusionary rule to deporation
hearings are especially horrendous. 9
On the other side of the balance, the SG argues that
"there is no evidence of widespread Fourth Amendment violations
by immigration officers," and thus that Resps have not
demonstrated any need for envocation of the exclusionary rule in
deportation hearings.
to that argument.

SG's Br., at 34-39.

There are two answers

First, the exclusionary rule applied until

1979 and presumably deterred 4th Amendment violations. Second,
'----- I .)-;nv ~
IA..k.

~.

9 Indeed, in his reply brief, the SG refutes his position that
the exclusionary rule will force a modification of INS techniques
by arguing that the exclusionary rule will have no deterrent
effect because INS agents a~e more concerned with the number of
arrests they make rather than the constitutional validity of
those arrests. See Reply Br., at 13.

).

since 1979 the INS has followed a conservative policy in
conducting search and seizures because it is uncertain whether
this Court will apply the exclusionary rule to deportation

°

hearings. 1

Fourth Amendment violations may increase once it is

clear that the exclusionary rule does not apply.
Resps argue that application of the exclusionary rule
will confer substantial social benefits.

The rule is not as

important, resps argue, to the protection of illegal aliens as to
the protection of the constitutional rights of our minority
citizens who share racial, ethnic, and linguistic characteristics
with the targets of immigration searches.

Ethnic characteristics

already are considered relevant factors in determining the
reasonableness of an investigatory stop of minimal intrusiveness.
See, e.g., United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422
(1975).

u.s.

873, 886-887

Absent the exclusionary rule, INS agents may feel free

to base "probable cause" almost entirely on such characteristics.
See, e.g., Resps' Br., at 97 nn. 81, 82 (describing examples of
careless arrests and deportations based merely on ethnic
appearance).

This argument is appealing.

It may be, however,

that legal residents are distinguished from likely illegal aliens

10 The Search & Seizure Manual for INS agents provides:
"Many of these areas of the law are in flux and have
not yet been settled by the Supreme Court •••• In these
areas, the Service ••• adopts a ••• policy which does
not test the limit of the ••• Constitution ••••
If our
policy is ••. more restrictive than the Constitutional
limit, ••• where that limit has not yet been determined
by the Supreme Court, our officers are less likely to
be involved in litigation over alleged violations of
persons' Constitutional rights." SG's Br., at 41.

bench memo: INS v. Lopez & Sandoval, No. 83-491
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during the investigatory stops and therefore generally will not
be subject to a 4th Amendment "seizure."
Resps' weakest argument is perhaps the most crucial to
their cause.

Some of the factors I mentioned in refuting the

~

SG's position also suggest that the exclusionary rule will not
have a significant deterrent effect in this context:
1. Although the exclusionary rule applied in theory until
1979, it was envoked successfully only three times in 76 years.
~

It is hardly likely that such an infrequently used rule exerts
much of a deterrent effect.
2. As the SG points out, INS agents are more concerned with
the "quality of apprehensions ••• than their quality under
constitutional standards."

Reply Br., at 13.

This is because

most illegal aliens who are apprehended leave voluntarily, or are
without the legal or financial means to envoke the rule.

Because

apprehension is ususally all that is necessary for a successful
deportation, the exclusionary rule is unlikely to deter any
"constitutional short cuts" INS agents may take.
unattractive but practical argument.

This is an

In sum, the exclusionary

rule may not have a significant deterrent effect.

CONCLUSION

The SG's argument that application of the exclusionary
rule to deportation hearings will wreak havoc with the system is
unconvincing.

On the other hand, the deterrent effect of the

exclusionary rule in deportation hearings is dubious.

I suspect

?
?
I
_,
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-

the Court will not choose this case to extend the exclusionary
rule for the first time to a civil proceeding.

As a practical

matter, this may not tempt an increase in 4th Amendment
violations.

,.

However, it may be an unattractive opinion to write.

April 13, 1984
INS GINA-POW
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INS v. Mendoza and Sandovol Sanchez

Memo to file
This
aliens,

is

the

third case this Term involving

illegal

and

the

second

of

case

involving

Immigration and Naturalization Service

efforts

(INS)

the

to identify

and deport - or permit voluntarily to leave the country illegal aliens.
The question presented is straightforward, important,
and

-

at

answer.

least

for

me at

this

time -

not difficult to

As framed by the SG the question is:

Fourth
Amendment's
"Whether
the
exclusionary rule should be extended to civil
deportation proceedings?
In

both

questioned

cases,

persons

consolidated
in

their

by

places

CA9,
of

INS

agents

employment

who

appeared to be Mexicans.
CA9 's opinion focused primarily on Sandovol 's case.
Officers

entered

search warrant

the

without

he

plant

a

ut with permission from company officials.

The facts of the case are quite similar to the case WHR
has written

.,,'· '

for

the Court,

and

in which

I

have filed a

2.

Officers entered the plant

separate concurring opinion.

and questioned employees, while other officers guarded the
exits.
\

men's

Thirty-seven aliens, who had been "detained in the
room"

following

whom

initial

the

officers

questions,

wished

were

to

interrogate

transferred

to

the

county jail and questioned further while in custody there.
CA9

doubted

individualized

that

there

suspicion

of

even a brief _ _ _ _ _ of

had

been

illegal
San

")

the

alienage

"requisite
to

Pet ion 7 A) •

justify
CA9 did

not decide the case on that issue, however, for it viewed
the

"dispositive question"

to be

the

unlawful detention

"at the time he was interrogated in jai 1.
the

initial

stop had

"r ippened

By that time,

into an arrest".

Citing

Dunaway.
CA9 recognized that:
"The question of the applicability of the
exclusionary rule in deportation proceedings is
one of first impression in this circuit." (Pet.
9a) •
CA9 cited United States ex rel, Bilokumsky
v • Tod , 2 6 3 U. S • 14 9 , 15 5 , as one in wh i c h the
Court "assunmed" that evidence obtained in an
illegal search and seizure could not be the
basis of a finding in a deportation proceeding.
CA9 concluded, however, that this Court had
never expressed a view on the specific issue.
It was said by CA9, however, that the "few
federal cases which have squarely confronted the
question have all held that evidence illegally

3.

obtained by federal agents is inadmissible in
subsequent deportation proceedings".
The dissent by Judge Alarcon took a very
different view:
"Today the majority has extended the
exclusionary rule to teh' suppression of oral
statements in civil ~portation proceedings.
None of the cases relied upon by the majority
support this radical departure from existing
law."
"In 1886, the United States Supreme Court
first applied the exclusionary rule in Boyd v.
United States, 116 u.s. 616 (1886).
Since that
date our highest Court has never apElieg the
eclusionary rule lfb_a civil proceeding.
The
Court~ has Hmtt-ett appficatron of" Erre rule to
criminal or quasi-criminal proceedings".
The

SG

does

not

contest

the

illegality

questioning, at least at the jailhouse.
that this would be

the first

of

the

Rather, he argues

time the exclusionary rule

has ever been extended to a civil proceeding, and argues
at length the adverse effect of such an extension would
have upon the enforcement of our immigration laws.

It is

conceded that the Fourth Amendment extends to deportable
aliens,

but

argues

illegal aliens
deportation

to

inappropriateness

invoke

proceedings

unlawful presence

in

of

"permitting

the exclus_tnary rule
in

order

in civil

-~ perpetuate

the United States".

their

SG's brief P.

10.

\'t,.. ,,

"'

,.,

•

4.

~~~~ v{;
k> ~
~~·
The argumentdf:1:!::
the exclusionary rule,

cases,~o ~er~ ' -~

in criminal

e¥eft

unlawful police conduct.

~e~ the Jpi;,o~~

The same policy considerations,

according to the SG, do not apply to the INS agents whose
duty it is to identify and detain persons believed to be
illegal aliens, affording them the opportunity voluntarily
to return to their native country or to have deportation

.___

..-..

z:::;

hearings.
Both of
have

the aliens

hearings.

involved

in this case chosef to

The administrative

judges

in both cases

ruled against the aliens, as did the Board of Immigration
Appeals.
Among

the

exclusionary

1

rule

"societal
to

costs

deportation

of

extending

proceedings",

the

the
SG

argues that the "exclusion of oral admissions of aliens is
likely to result in a _ _ _ _ grant of residence status
and

immunity

from

the

immigration

law

to

persons

not

ACLU,

is

entitled to be in this country."
Respondents
confusing
the

because

exclusionary

brief,

submitted

it appears
rule

was

by

to argues
uniformly

enforcement of immigration laws".

the

that until 1979,
applied

"to

the

5.

"Given the long history of applying a rule
of exciusion in deportation proceedings, and the
pressures for enhanced enforcement now faced by
INS,
abandonment of the rule at this time
without
the
existence of equally effective
alternatives will inevitrably lead to an "open
season" on Hispanic Americans, resulting in tfie
who3::esa~ "VH5l:'atlol'i' 'O'f F'ourth Amendment rights
based on racial or ethnic appearance.
Balancing
the societal costs of exclusion against the harm
to the rights of Hispanic Americans which would
flow from the loss of the rule 1 s substantial
deterrent impact on INS misconduct, this rule
must be applied in deportation proceedings."
The
that

brief,

in

rarely

the government 1 s

"rights

of

those

intemperate

position would

citizens

who

share

language,

argues

effect gravely

the

racial,

and

ethnic

linguistic characteristics" that make them the targets of
Brief 19.

immigration searches.

*
Although
be

said

for

in theory,
1

CA9 s

applies

to aliens,

protect

them

therefore,

is

in

a

*

*

there is

holding.

,...,-~..,--~,_~so~~

If

Fourt

Amendment

the exclusionary rule certainly would
criminal

whether

the

proceedings.

rationale of

with equal force in a civil proceedings.

The

question

the rule applies
I am inclined to

think not.
LFP, JR.
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No. 83-491

IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE,
PETITIONER v. ADAN LOPEZ-MENDOZA

2~
1-o sole_ ~
~~

~~
~~~~

~~
~

~~

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FO~ THE NINTH CIRCUIT
d_ j ?_.
[May-, 1984]

JUSTICE O'CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.
This litigation requires us to decide whether an admission
of unlawful presence in this country made8ubsequ'~n__,.t--,tio -an
a ~W~I~es must e excluded as e viaence in a
ivil~~ing.
We ho a a
e exclusionary
rule need not be applied in such a proceeding.
I
Respondents Adan Lopez-Mendoza and Elias SandovalSanchez, both citizens of Mexico, were summoned to separate
deportation proceedings. in California and Washington, and
both were ordered deEorted. They challenged the regularity of those proceedings on grounds related to the lawfulness
of their respective arrests by officials of the Immigration and
Naturalization Service (INS). On dmini~ati~~the
Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), an agency of the Department of Justice, affirmed theaeportation orders.
The Court of Appea s or e m
1rcuit, sitting en
bane, reversed Sandoval's deportation order and vacated and
remanded Lopez's deportation-order. 705 F. -2d 1059 (1983).
It ruled that Sandoval's admission of his illegal presence in
this country was the fruit of an unlawful arrest, and that the
exclusionary rule applied in a deportation proceeding. Lopez s e ortat10n or er was vacate an IS case remanded to
the BIA to determine whether the Fourth Amendment had

83-491-0PINION
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been violated in the course of his arrest. We granted certiorari, - - U. S. - - .
A
Respondent Lopez was arrested in 1976 by INS agents at
his place of emploYil!ent,
a transmission repair shop in San
............
Mateo California. Responding to a tip, INS investigators
arrived at the shop shortly before 8 a. m. The agents had
not sought a warrant to search the premises or to arrest any
of ITS oc~The proprietor of the shop firmly refused
to allow the agents to interview his employees during working hours. Nevertheless, while one agent engaged the proprietor in conversation another entered the shop and approached Lopez. In response to the agent's questioning,
Lopez gave his name and m icated that he was om Mexico
witn no c1o~ 1es m e
·e
es.
e agent
thenpracea him under arrest. Lopez unde~t ~er
questioning at INS offices, where he ~dmitt~e was born in
MexiCO,~liacit'izen of Mexico, and had entered this
country without inspection by immigration authorities.
Based on his answers, the agents prepared a "Record of Deportable Alien" (Form I-213), and an affidavit which Lopez
executed, admitting his Mexican nationality and his illegal
entry into this country.
A hearing was held before an immigration judge. Lopez's
counsel moved to terminate the proceeding on the ground
that Lopez had been arrested illegally. The judge ruled that
the le~lity of the arrest was not relevanLto t~tion
procee ing and t ere ore declme to ru e on the egality of
Lopez's' arrest. Matter of Lopez[-}Mendoza, No. A22 452
208 (INS Dec. 21, 1977), re~inted in Pet. for Cert. 97a. The
Form I-213 and the affidavit executed by Lopez were received into idence without objection from Lopez. On t he
basis of this evidence the immigration JU ge found Lopez deportable. Lopez was granted the option of voluntary
departure.

83-491-0PINION
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The BIA dismissed Lopez's appeal. It noted that "[t]he
mere factOfanll ega arrest has no bearing on a subsequent
deportation proceeding," In re Lopez-Mendoza, No. A22 452
208 (BIA Sept. 19, 1979), reprinted in Pet. for Cert. 100a,
102a, and observed that Lopez had not objected to the admission into evidence of Form I-213 and the affidavit he had executed. I d., at 103a. The BIA also noted that the exclusionary rule is not applied to redress the injury to the privacy of
the search victim, and that the BIA had previously concluded
that application of the rule in deportation proceedings to deter unlawful INS conduct was inappropriate. Matter of
Sandoval, 17 I. & N. Dec. 70 (BIA 1979).
The Court of Appeals vacated the order of deportation and
remanded for a determination whether Lopez's Fourth
Amendment rights had been violated when he was arrested.
B

Respondent Sandoval (who is not the same individual who
was involved in Matter of Sandoval, supra) was arrested in
1977 at his place of employment, a potato processing plant in
Pasco, Washington. INS Agent Bower and other officers
went to the plant, with the ermission of its ersonnel managir, to check for illegal aliens.
urmg a c ange m s ift officers stationed themselves at the exits while Bower and a_ ~
formed Border Patrol a ent entered the plant.
ey went
to 11ielunc room and identified themse ves as immigration
officers. Many people in the room rose and headed for the
exits or milled around; others in the plant left their equipment and started running; still others who were entering the
plant turned aroun an started walking back out. The two
officers eventually stationed themselves at the main entrance
to the plant and looked for passing employees who averted
their heads, avoided eye contact, or tried to hide themselves
in a group. Those individuals were addressed with innocuous questions in English. Ar:y who could not respond J.n
English and who otherwise aroused AgenT Bower's suspi-

_.~
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cions were questioned in Spanish as to their right to be in the
United States.
Respondent Sandoval was in a line of workers entering the
plant. Sandoval testified that he did not realize that immigration officers were checking people entering the plant, but
that he did see standing at the plant entrance a man in uniform who appeared to be a police officer. Agent Bower testified that it was probable that he, not his partner, had questioned Sandoval at the plant, but that he could not be
absolutely positive. The employee he thought he remembered as Sandoval had been "very evasive," had averted his
head, turned around, and walked away when he saw Agent
Bower. App. 137, 138. Bower was certain that no one was
questioned about his status unless his actions had given the
agents reason to believe that he was an undocumented alien.
Thirty-seven employees, including Sandoval, were briefly ~ 7 ~1-41
det~ and then taken to the count~ jail.
1 2. ~
About one-third immediately availed themselves of the option of voluntary departure and were put on a bus to Mexico. k ~
Sandoval exercised his right to a deportation hearing . .,L.-z:> ~~ J
Sandoval was then questioned.iurther, and Agent Bower re- ~ ~
corded Sandova s a InlSSion o unlawful entry. Sandoval
,., . L.-L 1 k
contends he was not aware a e ad a right to remain si- ~
lent. .&,pparently all 37 arrestees were subsequently deteP<--- ~ ~
..miaea te be illegally pteseat iu this country.
...r
~
At his deportation hearing Sandoval contended that the evidence offered by the INS should be suppressed as the fruit of
an unlawful arrest. The immigration judge considered and
rejected Sandoval's claim that he had been illegally arrested,
but ruled in the alternative that the legality of the arrest was
not relevant to the deportation hearing.
Matter of
Sandoval-Sanchez, No. A22 346 925 (INS Oct. 7, 1977), reprinted in Pet. for Cert. at 104a. Based on the written
record of Sandoval's admissions the immigration judge found
him deportable and granted him voluntary departure. The
BIA dismissed Sandoval's appeal. In re Sandoval-Sanchez,

J

I

,

'·~
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No. A22 346 925 (BIA Feb. 21, 1980). It concluded that the
circumstances of the arrest had not affected the voluntariness
of his recorded admission, and again declined to invoke the
exclusionary rule, relying on its earlier decision in Matter of
Sandoval, supra.
On appeal the Court of Appeals concluded that Sandoval's
detention by the immigration officers violated the Fourth
Amendment, that the statements he made were a product of
that detention, and that the exclusionary rule barred their
use in a deportation hearing. The deportation order against
Sandoval was accordingly reversed.
II

A deportation proceeding is a tfurely c~ to determine eligibility to remain in this country, not to punish an unlawful entry, though entering or remaining unlaWfully in this
country is itself a crime. 8 U. S. C. §§ 1302, 1306, 1325.
The deportation ~aring looks p_!ospe£1jvely, to the resQondent's right to remain in 1llls count in the future. Past conduct is re evant only msofar as it may shed light on the respondent's right to remain. See 8 U. S. C. §§ 1251, 1252(b);
Bugajewitz v. Adams, 228 U. S. 585, 591 (1913); Fong Yue
Ting v. United States, 149 U. S. 698, 730 (1893).
A deportation hearing is held before an immigration judge. ~
The judge's sole power is to order deportation; t~e judge ~n- \)_,JL . . _ --;.,w
not a~t or punish the res ondent for any crime /~
_
1
re a e o un a
1 entry into or presence in this country. ~ ~
Consistent with the civil nature of the proceeding, various ~
protections that apply in the context of a criminal trial do not
apply in a deportation hearing. The respondent must be
given "a reasonable opportunity to be present at [the] proceeding," but if the respondent fails to avail himself of that
opportunity the hearing may proceed in his absence. 8
U. S. C. § 1252(b). In many deportation cases the INS must
show only identity and alienage; the burden then shifts to the
respondent to prove the time, place and manner of his entry.

--
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See 8 U. S. C. § 1361; Matter of Sandoval, supra. A decision of deportability need be based onl on "reaso!!,3b~
stan 1a, and pro a 1ve evi ence," 8 U. S. C. § 1252(b)(4).
The-ETA or 1~quired only "clear, unequivocal
and convincing" evidence of the respondent's deportability,
not~asonable doubt. 8 CFR §242.14(a).
The Courts of Appea s ave e d, for example that the absence of Miranda warnings does not render an otherwise voluntary statement by the respondent inadmissible in a de. n case. Navia-Duran v. INS, 568 F. 2d 803, 808
77); Avila-Gallegos v. INS, 525 F. 2d 666, 667~
), Chavez-Raya v. INS, 519 F. 2d 397, 399-401(JQ_AV
1975). See also Abel v. United States, 362 U. S. 217,
236--237 (1960) (search pe~ted incidental to an arrest pursuant to an administrative warrant issued by the INS);
Galvan v. Press, 347 U. S. 522, 531 (1954) (ex post facto
Clause has no application to deportation); Carlson v. Landon, 342 U. S. 524, 544-546 (1952) (Eighth Amendment does
not require bail to be granted in certain deportation cases);
United States ex rel. Bilokumsky v. Tod, 263 U. S. 149, 157
(1923) (involuntary confessions admissible at deportation
hearing). In short, aaeporta'fionnearing is mtended to proviae a streamlined determination of eligibility to remain in
this country, nothing more. Although deportation undoubte~ "visits....,_.a great hardship" on the person deported,
Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U. S. 135, 154 (1945), the purpose of
deportation is not to punish past transgressions but rather to
put an end to a continuing violation of the immigration laws.

~

III

The "body'' or identity of a defendant or respondent in a
crimmal or civil proceeiling is never 1~elf suppressible as a
~ ~ tiQ
fruit of an unlawful arrest, even if ifTs conceaeaUia£ an unlawful arrest, search, or interrogation occurred.
See
~ ~~ Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U. S. 103, 119 (1975); Frisbie v. Col/ __
L
lins, 342 U. S. 519, 522 (1952); United $tates ex rel.
1'-t/)
L- r
vt- 4...---'r.

-r--c 7

~~·
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msky_ v. Tod, supra, at 158. A similar rule applies in
s directed a~ontra and or forfeitable property.
ee, e. g., United States v. Eighty-Eight
Thousana: Five Hundred Dollars, 671 F. 2d 293 (CA8 1982);
United States v. One (1) 1971 Harley-Davidson Motorcycle,
508 F. 2d 351 (CA9 1974); United States v. One 1965 Buick,
397 F. 2d 782 (CA6 1968).
On this basis alone the Court of Appealsldecision as tore- ~
spondent Lopez must be reversed. At his deportation hearing Lopez objected onl to the fact that he had been summone to a eportation earing o oWing an un a
arrest;
h~ en er
no ~ec;, Ion tot e eVI ence o ered agrunst him.
The BIA correctfy ruled that "[t]he mere fact of an illegal arrest has no bearing on a subsequent deportation proceeding."1 In re Lopez-Mendoza, supra, reprinted in Pet. for
Cert. 102a.
IV
Respondent Sandoval has a more substantial claim. He
ob.ifuted not to his compelled presence at a deportation procee mg, but to evidence offered at that proceeding. The
general rule in a criminal proceeding is that statements and
other evidence obtained as a result of an unlawful, warrantless arrest are suppressible if the link between the evidence
and the unlawful conduct is not too attenuated. Wong Sun
v. United States, 371 U. S. 471 (1963). The reach of the exclusionary rule beyond the context of a criminal prosecution,
"lo

orfeit~oceedin

1
The Court of Appeals brushed over Lopez's failure to object to the evidence in an apparently unsettled footnote of its decision. The Court of Appeals was initially of the view that a motion to terminate a proceeding on
the ground that the arrest of the respondent was unlawful is, "for all practical purposes," the same as a motion to suppress evidence as the fruit of an
unlawful arrest. Slip opinion, at 1765, n. 1 (Apr. 25, 1983). In the bound
report of its opinion, however, the Court of Appeals takes a somewhat different view, stating in a revised version of the same footnote that "the only
reasonable way to interpret the motion to terminate is as one that includes
both a motion to suppress and a motion to dismiss." 705 F. 2d 1059, 1060,
n. 1 (1983).
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~~~ less

clear.

Although this Court has once stated

______ _.,--t at "[i]t may be assumed that evidence obtained

by t e abor] Department through an illegal search and seizure cannot be made the basis of a finding in deportation proceedings," United States ex rel. Bilokumsky v. Tod, supra,
at 155, the Court has never squarely addressed the question
before. Lower court decisions dealing with this question are
sparse. 2
~
In United States v. Janis, 428 U. S. 433 (1976), this Court t7
set forth a framework furdecidin in what t es of~roc;eding application of the exclusionary rule is a propriate. Imprecise as e exercise may be, the Court recognized in Janis
that there is no choice but to weigh the~ely social benefits
of ~xcluding:_ U!J.la
eized evidence against the likely
costs. On the enefit Sl oftiiel)alance "the '~rime pur- , ~
pose' of the [exclusionary] rule, if not the sole one, -1.s to deter '-:/ L-c..- j--D
future unlawful police conduct."' Id., at 446, citing United
States v. Calaiulra, 414 U. S. 338, 347 (1974). On the cost
'~ ~
~there is the loss of often probative evidence and all off11e
secondary costs that flow from the less accurate or more cumbersome adjudication that therefore occurs.
At stake in Jan is was application of the exclusionary rule
in a federal civil tax assessment proceeding following the unlawful seizure o ev1 ence y state, not federal, officials.
The Court noted at the outset that "[i]n the complex and tur- (_ ~
bulent history of the rule, the Court never has applied it to ) {) ___
exclude evidence from a civil proceeding, federal or state."
428 U. S., at 447 (footnote omitted). Two factors in Janis
2
In United States v. Wong Quong Wong, 94 F. 832 <D(Vt. 1899), a district judge excluded letters seized from the appellant in a civil deportation
proceeding. In Ex Parte Jackson, 263 F. 110 (D_(Mont.), appeal dismissed
sub nom. Andrews v. Jackson, 267 F. 1022 (CA9 1920), another district
judge granted habeas corpus relief on the ground that papers and pamphlets used against the habeas petitioner in a deportation proceeding had
been unlawfully seized. Wong Chung Che v. INS, 565 F. 2d 166 (CAl
1977), held that papers obtained by INS agents in an unlawful search are
inadmissible in deportation proceedings.

I)
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suggested that the deterrence value of the exclusionary rule
in the context of that case was slight. First, the state law
enforcement officials were already "punished" by the exclusion of the evidence in the state criminal trial as a result of
the same conduct. I d., at 448. Second, the evidence was
also excludable in any federal criminal trial that might be
held. Both factors suggested that further application of the
exclusionary rule in the federal civil proceeding would contribute little more to the deterrence of unlawful conduct by
state officials. On the cost side of the balance, Janis focuse~
simply on the loss of "concededly relevant and reliable evi~~
dence." !d., at 447. The Court concluded that, on balance,
tJ ~~
this cost outweighed the likely social benefits achievable
through application of the exclusionary rule in the federal
civil proceeding.
While it seems likely that the deterrence value of applying
the exclusionary rule in deportation proceedings would be
higher than it was in Janis, it is also quite clear that the ~
cial costs would be very much greater as well. Applying the
J anfs balancing test to the benefits and costs of excluding
concededly reliable evidence from a deportation proceeding,
we therefore reach the same conclusion as~ in Janis. .J-The likely deterrence value of the exclusionary rule in deportation procee ings 1s difficult to assess. On the one
hand, a civil deportation procee mg 1s a civil complement to a
possible criminal prosecution, and to this extent it resembles
the civil proceeding under review in Janis. The INS does
not suggest that the exclusion;u-y rule ~e to
ap~ ~ocee m s against an alien who unlawfully
enters or remruns m t is country, ndtne prospect of losing
evidence that might otherwise be used in a criminal prosecution undoubtedly supplies some residual deterrent to unlaw- ~
ful conduct by INS officials. But it must be acknowledged
that only a very small percentage of arrests of aliens are intended or expected to lead to criminal prosecutions. Thus
the arresting officer's primary objective, in practice, will be
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to use evidence in the civil deportation proceeding. Moreover, here, in contrast to Janis, the agency officials who effect the unlawful arrest are the same officials who subsequently bring the deportation action. As recognized in
Janis, the exclusionary rule is likely to be most effective
when applied to such "intrasovereign" violations.
Nonetheless, several other factors significantly reduce the
likely deterrent value of the exclusionary rule in a civil deportation proceeding. First, regardless of how the arrest is
effected, deportation will still be possible when evidence not
derived direct from the arrest is s c1ent to su ort dee , many deportation
portation. As e
as re
proceedings "the sole matters necessary for the Government
to establish are the respondent's identity and alienage-at
which point the burden shifts to the respondent to prove the
time, place and manner of entry." Matter of Sandoval, 17 I.
& N. Dec., at 79. Since the person and identity of the respondent are not themselves suppressible, see supra, at
--ll, the INS must prove only alienage, and that will sometimes be possible using evidence gathered independently of,
or sufficiently attenuated from, the original arrest. See
Matter of Sandoval, supra, at 79; seete. g., Avila-Gallegos v. 1\.
INS, 525 F. 2d 666 (CA2 1975). The INS's task is simplified J
in this regard by the civil nature of the proceeding. As Justice Brandeis stated: "Silence is often evidence of the most
persuasive character.... [T]here is no rule of law which prohibits officers charged with the administration of the immigration law from drawing an inference from silence of one
who is called upon to spea . . . .
person
es d on the
preliminary warrant is not protected by a presumption of citizenship comparable to the presumption of innocence in a
criminal case. There is no provision which forbids drawing ~
an adverse inference from the fact of standing mute."
United States ex rel. Bilokumsky v. Tod, 263 U. S., at
153-154.
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The second factor is a ractical one. In the course of a
year the /a~erage INS agen arrests almost 500 illegal aliens.
Brief or e 1tioner 38. Over 97.5% apparently agree to voluntary deportation without a formal hearing. 705 F. 2d, at
1071, n. 17. Among the remainder who do request a formal
hearing (apparently a dozen or so in all, per officer, per year)
very few challenge the circumstances of their arrests. As
noted by the Court of Appeals, "the BIA was able to find only
two reported immigration cases sfnce 1899'in which the Texclusionary] rule was app e to bar unlawful y seiZe evidence, on~ch the rule's application was
specifically addressed, and fewer than fifty BIA proceedings
since 1952 in which a Fourth Amendment challenge to the introduction of evidence was even raised." I d., at 1071.
Every BIA agent knows, therefore, that it is highly unlikely
that any particular arrestee will end Ufl challenging the lawfulness of his arrest in a formal deportation proceeding.
When an occasional challenge is brought, the consequences
from the point of view of the officer's overall arrest and deportation record will be trivial. In these circumstances, the
arresting officer is most unlikely to shape his conduct in
anticipation of the exclusion of evidence at a formal deportation hearing.
Third, and perhaps most important, the INS has its own,
comprehensive scheme for deterring Fourth Amendment violations by its officers. Most arrests of illegal aliens away
from the border occur dunn:-~, or ot er workplace surveys. Large numbers of illegafaliens are often arrested a one time, and conditions are understandably chaotic. See Brief for Petitioner in INS v. Delgado, 0. T. 1983,
No. 82-1271, pp. 3-5. To safeguard the rights of those who
are lawfully present at inspected workplaces the INS has dej
veloped rules restricting stop, interrogation, and arrest prac
tices. Id., at 7, n. 7, 32-40, and n. 25. These regulation
require that no one be detained without reasonable suspicion
of illegal alienage, and that no one be arrested_unless there is
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an admission of illegal alienage or other strong evidence
thereof. New immigration officers receive instruction and
examination in Fourth Amendment law, and others receive
periodic refresher courses in law. Brief for Petitioner 39-40.
Evidence seized through intentionally unlawful conduct is excluded by Department of Justice policy from the proceeding
for which it was obtained. See Memorandum from Benjamin
R. Civiletti to Heads of Offices, Boards, Bureaus and Divisions, Violations of Search and Seizure Law (Jan. 16, 1981).
The INS also has in place a procedure for investigating and
punishing immigration officers who commit Fourth Amendment violations. See INS, U. S. Dep't of Justice, The Law
of Arrest, Search, and Seizure for Immigration Officers 35
(Rev. Jan. 1983).
Finally, the deterrent value of the exclusionary rule in deportation proceedings is ~ed by the availability of alternative remedies for institutional practices by the INS that
might violate Fourth Amendment rights. The INS is a single agency, under central federal control, and engaged in operations of broad scope but highly repetitive chartJ,cter. The
possibilit of Meclaratory relief a ainst the agency thus offers
a pot;illtit·':a.,
. ll;::y:--e~e~c~Iv~e~
m!=::e~a==
ns
s~
o ~c:;:;;:;:::
aFFe~n~gi
~n
~g
~~e validity of
INS practices. Cf. INS v. Delgado,-- U.S.-- (1984).
In addition, actions for constitutional torts remain o en to
those sub· ect to unlawful sea hes and seizures. See Btvens
v. Six Un nown
. Narcotics Agents, 403 U. S. 388
(1971).
Petitioners argue that retention of the exclusionary rule is
necessary to safeguard the Fourth Amendment rights of ethnic Americans, particularly the Hispanic-Americans lawfully
in this country. We recognize that petitioners raise here legitimate and important concerns. But application of the exclusionary rule to civil deportation proceedings can be justified only if the rule is likely to add significant protection to
these Fourth Amendment rights. The exclusionary rule
provides no remedy for completed wrongs; those lawfully in
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this country can be interested in its application only insofar
as it may serve as an effective deterrent to future INS misconduct. For the reasons we have discussed we conclude
that application of the rule in INS civil deportation proceedings, as in the circumstances discussed in Janis, "is unlikely
to provide significant, much less substantial, additional deterrence." 428 U. S., at 458. Important as it is to protect
the Fourth Amendment rights of all persons, there is no convincing indication that application of the exclusionary rule in
civil deportation proceedings will contribute materially to
that end.
On the other side of the scale, the social costs of applying
the exclusionary rule in deportation proceedings are both unusual and significant. The first cost is one that is unique to
continuing violations of the law. Applying the exclusionary
rule in proceedings that are intended not to punish past
transgressions but to prevent their continuance or renewal
would require the courts to close their eyes to ongoing violations of the law. This Court has never before accepted costs
of this character in applying the exclusionary rule.
Presumably no one would argue that the exclusionary rule
should be invoked to prevent an agency from ordering corrective action at a leaking hazardous waste dump if the evidence
underlying the order had been improperly obtained, or to
compel police to return contraband explosives or drugs to
their owner if the contraband had been unlawfully seized.
On the rare occasions that it has considered costs of this type
the Court has firmly indicated that the exclusionary rule does
not extend this far. See United States v. Jeffers, 342 U. S.
48, 54 (1951); Trupiano v. United States, 334 U. S. 699, 710
(1948). The rationale for these holdings is not difficult to
find. "Both Trupiano and Jeffers concerned objects the possession of which, without more, constitutes a crime. The repossession of such per se contraband by Jeffers and Trupiano
would have subjected them to criminal penalties. The return of the contraband would clearly have frustrated the ex-
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press public policy against the possession of such objects."
One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U. S. 693,

699 (1965) (footnote omitted). Precisely the same can be
said here. Sandoval is a person whose unregistered presence in this country, without more, constitutes a crime. His
release within our borders would immediately subject him to
criminal penalties. His release would clearly frustrate the
express public policy against an alien's unregistered presence
in this country. Even the objective of deterring Fourth
Amendment violations should not require such a result. The
constable's blunder may allow the criminal to go free, but we
have never suggested that it allows the criminal to continue
in the commission of an ongoing crime. When the crime in
question involves unlawful presence in this country, the criminal may go free, but he should not go free within our
borders. 3
Other .factors also weigh against applying the exclusionary
rule in deportation. proceedings. The BIA currently operates a deliberately simple deportation hearing system,
streamlined to permit the quick resolution of very large numbers of deportation actions, and it is against this backdrop
that the costs of the exclusionary must be assessed. The average immigration judge handles about 6 deportation hearings per day. Brief for Petitioner 27 n. 16. Neither the
hearing officers nor the attorneys participating in those hearings are likely to be well-versed in the intricacies of Fourth
Amendment law. The prospect of even occasional invocation
of the exclusionary rule might significantly change and com3Similarly, in Sure-Tan, Inc . v. NLRB,- U.S.- (1984), W&concluded that an employer can be guilty of an unfair labor practice in his dealings with an alien notwithstanding the alien's illegal presence in this country. Retrospective sanctions against the employer may accordingly be
imposed by the NLRB to further the public policy against unfair labor
practices. But while he maintains the status of an illegal alien, the employee is plainly not entitled to the prospective relief-reinstatement and
continued employment-that probably would be granted to other victims of
similar unfair labor practices.

+~ ~ c!.c tJ I( 1-

83-491-0PINION
INS v. LOPEZ-MENDOZA

15

plicate the character of these proceedings. The BIA has described the practical problems as follows:
"Absent the applicability of the exclusionary rule, questions relating to deportability routinely involve simple
factual allegations and matters of proof. When Fourth
Amendment issues are raised at deportation hearings,
the result is a diversion of attention from the main issues
which those proceedings were created to resolve, both in
terms of the expertise of the administrative decision
makers and of the structure of the forum to accommodate inquiries into search and seizure questions. The
result frequently seems to be a long, confused record in
which the issues are not clearly defined and in which
there is voluminous testimony . . . . The ensuing delays
and inordinate amount of time spent on such cases at all
levels has an adverse impact on the effective administration of the immigration laws . . . . This is particularly
true in a proceeding where delay may be the only 'defense' available and where problems already exist with
the use of dilatory tactics." Matter of Sandoval, 17 I. &
N., at 80 (footnote omitted).
This sober assessment of the exclusionary rule's likely costs,
by the agency that would have to administer the rule in at
least the administrative tiers of its application, cannot be
brushed off lightly.
The BIA's concerns are reinforced by the staggering dimension of the problem that the INS confronts. Immigration officers apprehend over one million deportable aliens in
this country every year. I d., at 85. A single agent may arrest many illegal aliens every day. Although the investigatory burden does not justify the commission of constitutional
violations, the officers cannot be expected to compile elaborate, contemporaneous, written reports detailing the circumstances of every arrest. At present an officer simply completes a "Record of Deportable Alien" that is introduced to
prove the INS's case at the deportation hearing; the officer

fi

•

..

83-491-0PINION

16

INS v. LOPEZ-MENDOZA

..

rarely must attend the hearing. Fourth Amendment suppression hearings would undoubtedly require considerably
more, and the likely burden on the administration of the immigration laws would be correspondingly severe.
Finally, the INS advances the credible argument that applying the exclusionary rule to deportation proceedings
might well result in the suppression of large amounts on information that had been obtained entirely lawfully. INS arrests occur in crowded and confused circumstances. Though
the INS agents are instructed to follow procedures that adequately protect Fourth Amendment interests, agents will
usually be able to testify only to the fact that they followed
INS rules. The demand for a precise account of exactly
what happened in each particular arre.s t would plainly preclude mass arrests, even when the INS is confronted, as it
often is, with massed numbers of ascertainably illegal aliens.
In these circumstances we are persuaded that the Janis
balance between costs and benefits comes out against applying the exclusionary rule in civil deportation hearings held by
the INS. By all appearances the INS has already taken sensible and reasonable steps to deter Fourth Amendment violations by its officers, and this makes the likely additional deterrent value of the exclusionary rule small. The costs of
applying the exclusionary rule in the context of civil deportation hearings are high. In particular, application of the exclusionary rule in cases such as Sandoval's, would compel the
courts to release from custody persons who would then immediately resume their commission of a crime through their
continuing, unlawful presence in this country. "There comes
a point at which courts, consistent with their duty to administer the law, cannot continue to create barriers to law enforcement in the pursuit of a supervisory role that is properly the
duty of the Executive and Legislative Branches." United
States v. Janis, 428 U. S., at 459. That point has been
reached here.
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We do not condone any violations of the Fourth Amendment that may have occurred in the arrests of respondents
Lopez or Sandoval. Moreover, no challenge is raised here to
the INS's own internal regulations. Cf. INS v. Delgado,
- - U. S. - - (1984). These regulations might be vulnerable, and indeed our conclusions concerning the exclusionary
rule's value might change, if there developed good reason to
believe that Fourth. Amendment violations by INS officers
were widespread. Cf. .United States v. Leon, - - U. S.
- - (BLACKMUN, J., concurring). Finally, we do not deal
here w1th egregious violations of Fourth Amendment or
other liberties that might transgress notions of fundamental
fairness and undermine the probative value of the evidence
obtained} .Cf. Rochin v. California, 342 U. S. 165 (1952).
At issue here is the exclusion of credible evidence gathered in
connection with peaceful arrests by INS officers. We hold
that evidence derived from such arrests need not be suppressed in an INS civil deportation hearing.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is therefore
Reversed

•we note that subsequent to its decision in Matter of Sandoval, 17 I. &
N. 70 (1979), the BIA held that evidence will be excluded if the circumstances surrounding a particular arrest and interrogation would render use
of the evidence obtained thereby "fundamentally unfair" and in violation of
due process requirements of the fifth amendment. Matter of Toro, 17 I.
&. N. Dec. 340, 343 (BIA 1980). See also Matter of Garcia, 17 I. & N.
Dec. 319, 321 (BIA 1980) (suppression of admission of alienage obtained
after request for counsel had been repeatedly refused); In re Ramira-Cordova, No. A21 095 659 (BIA Feb. 21, 1980) (suppression of evidence obtained as a result of a night-time warrantless entry into the aliens'
residence).
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